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When outside observers peer into the American political 
process they usually focus their attention upon the elected 
representatives. These men and women are the most visible 
incarnations of the actors who wield the political power at 
every level of American society. Indeed, the President of 
the United States is the single most visible politician in 
America. No one would argue that the power he holds is enor­
mous. It takes men of tremendous confidence, as well as ego, 
to seek to run for the office of President. Yet, since he is 
elected, he is at least marginally beholden to those who helpdd 
elect him to try to appease their desires. Thus, outside ob­
servers might say, the President of the United States rep­
resents a democratic ideali that the winner of the election 
struggle serves those who helped him and followed him into , 
office.
At the Federal level, the House of Representatives and 
Senate are comprised of men and women who are also indebted 
to those who helped them achieve their political office. This 
serves as an even greater index of democracy American-style 
in two respects. First, these actors represent people from 
more narrowly drawn boundaries. This means the winning rep­
resentatives come from constituencies, with more narrowly 
drawn characteristics-- and then the legislatures reflect the 
sum of America's parts, instead of the national coalition of 
interests that the President must cater to in winning his 
election. Second, these representatives sit in the legis­
lature which forms part of the supreme law of the land. Thus, 
national policy forms out of inputs of men and women who rep-
1
2resent the diverse populace of American society. If one con­
stituency sees their needs go unmet» they need only elect a 
new representative to insure their desires are sounded out in 
America's most prominent lawmaking forum. Even so, represent­
ation is no guarantee of victory in the political arena. 
Specific interests must court like-minded legislators to gain 
what they value and win out over competing interests. Still, 
those who believe democracy is evinced by legislators also 
believe that the election of these representatives is the key­
stone to American (as well as British)-style democracy.
Yet, a seemingly undemocratic institution lies on equal 
footing with the executive and legislative branches of the 
Federal Government. The Supreme Court consists of eight men 
and one woman who are not elected, nor are beholden to any 
interests which might curry favor with the President or rep­
resentatives. These men (and woman) have life tenure and can­
not be legally removed from their positions without impeach­
ment. Only one justice, Samuel Chase, has faced impeachment 
proceedings in the history of America since adoption of the 
Constitution. However undemocratic the Supreme Court appears, 
it nonetheless plays a key role in shaping laws in American 
society. By ruling on the constitutionality of state and fed­
eral laws, the Court offers affected parties one last chance 
to receive the political outcome they seek from the American 
political system.
In his article, "Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group 
Activity,” Clement E. Vose notes that between 1938 and 1958, 
the Jehovah's Witnesses won forty-four of fifty-four cases 
they brought before the Supreme Court/ Since the Jehovah's
3Witnesses ere relatively small in number, their ability to 
satisfy their needs through the electoral political process 
most likely is weak. Yet, with victories at the Supreme Court, 
their values have been legitimised, and now,barring reversal, 
are in concert with the supreme law of the land.
The extraordinary success of the Jehovah's Witnesses in
gaining Supreme Court approval as to the validity and legality
of their claims has other pressure:groups attempting the same 
2strategy. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the suc­
cessful effort of the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People (NAACP) in getting the "separate but 
equal doctrine" of school segregation declared unconstitution­
al in addition to winning judgements desegregating other types 
of schools= which featured racial separation. The thesis will 
attempt to discern what the Supreme Court says on the subject 
and why it says it, what exactly was won by the NAACP, what 
was the behavior of the competing interests after the Brown 
decision, and whether the "activist" behavior of the Supreme 
Court in proffering these rulings threatens the pristine no­
tion of democracy as the interplay of elected officials. The 
thesis will also attempt to discover any lessons that should 
be learned by other groups which want to use litigation as the 
path to political success.
PART I- BROWN AND BROWNII
The case, B»own v. Board of Education of Topeka, ended, 
in part, fifty-eight years of the "separate but equal" doctrine 
of race relations.^ The doctrine, first enounciated in a rail­
way transportation case, Plessv v. Ferguson, stated that sep-
arate but equal facilities for blacks were not violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. The doctrine was then seen 
to be applicable to public school segregation in a 1927 de­
cision, Gong Lum v. Rice.* The unanimous opinion in Brown 
found *?separate but equal had no place in the field of edu­
cation.
The decision itself was limited to a certain type of 
school system. The group of cases decided with Brown were 
shown, "(I)n each instance, they (the plaintiffs) have been 
denied admission to schools attended by white children under
7
laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race."'
The practice, simply stated occurs when a particular state orders 
the local school boards to maintain separate facilities for 
black and white students.
While declaring these dual school systems!illegal, the 
Court did not even consider whether the facilities were equal.
The Court claimedi "Here..., there are findings below that the 
Negro and white schools involved have been equalised with re­
spect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of
Q
teachers and other tangible factors." Thus, the judgement the 
Court was about to render showed the doctrine in the "best” 
light. Richard Kluger offered a picture of the separate but 
equal doctrine in a less favorable light in his book, Simple 
Justice. He notes the sixty-one black schools attended by 6,531 
pupils in Clarendon County, South Carolina were valued at
575• while the twelve schools attended by 2,375 whites 
was valued at $673*850. Hence, one can conclude the Brown 
decision was not based on the quality of materials or amount 
of money provided for black education.
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Chief Justice Warren wrote• "We must look instead to the 
effect s£ segregation itself on public education." (emphasis 
mine) He then argued that the physical separation of white 
from black student visited a psychological harm upon the Negro 
children. He surmised. "To separate them from others of sim* 
ilar age and qualifications solely' because of their race gen- 
erates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com­
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
1 1
likely ever to be undone." He also noted a Kansas court made
a similar finding and came to the conclusion that."The impact
is greater when it has the sanction of the lawj for the policy
of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting
12the inferiority of the negro group." Thus the Court con­
cluded, "Separate educational facilities are inherently un­
equal."1^
In Brown II. the Court instructed the parties of Brown as 
to how to procede upon the findings of the earlier case.
In order to desegregate. "School authorities have the primary 
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these 
problemsi courts will have to consider whether the action of 
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of 
the governing constitutional p r i n c i p l e s . T h e  Supreme 
Court then remanded the cases to the lower courts to assess 
the school boards' compliance.
The Supreme Court realized that the school boards would 
need time to design the proper remedies. They noted the courts 
wofcld be guided by equitable principles to allow for flexibil­
ity*^, and wanted the plans drawn up with "all deliberate
6speed.m1^ The Court did claim however, that "The burden rests
upon the defendants to establish that such (additional) time
is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with
18
good faith compliance at the earliest possible date."
After the decisions, both parties knew that de jure seg­
regation was outlawed, and that school boards had the duty to 
end the dual school systems, but neither party was really 
sure of the legal principle expounded in these cases. In 
Brown. Chief Justice Warren did not apply the standard two- 
tier test usually used in equal protection cases. The so- 
called rational basis/strict scrutiny test was not even ment­
ioned in the decision.
The test has been applied to Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection questions when classes of individuals claim the 
states have acted against them as a specific group. The 
Court also fields these claims under an equal protection in­
terpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court then decides if the claim concerns a fundamental 
right (e.g. freedom of speech), or a protected group (such as 
blacks). If they find either situation exists, then they 
place the burden on the government to show a compelling state 
interest in promulgating the law in question. If neither sit­
uation exists, then the government merely needs to show that 
the law in question was rationally related to achieving a 
valid governmental objective, and the law stands. In Brown, 
the protected class of blacks probably would have persuaded 
the Court to hold de jure segregation to the strict scrutiny 
test.
The Court <».d use the two-tier test in a school deseg-
7regatior^case decided on the same day as Brown. In Bolling v. 
Sharpe. the Court found the Washington D.C. school system to 
be in violation of equal protection as delineated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In that case, the 
Supreme Court found school segregation by law could not even 
pass the weakest degree of scrutiny. The opinion stated that 
school segregation was, "unreasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective.
Critics of that conclusion see segregation fufilling a 
proper governmental objective. John Denton Carter, in his 
book, 'he Warren Court and the Constitution, felt the focus 
of the Supreme Court's inquiry fell off the mark. He offered, 
"The question is not whether separate schools are good or bad, 
but whether at this point in time they are necessary to pre­
serve racial peace, a sense of racial community, and public 
21order." University of California Law Professor Frank I.
Goodman also sees a viable state interest in avoiding racial
22conflict in the schools." But he questions whether this is 
an interest truly promoted by those state governments, or 
were they merely segregating just to separate? In that case 
the Court may be balancing the governmental interest versus 
the harm they feel is caused by school segregation. J
The issue of whether proof of harm was controlling in 
Brown offers another question to be addressed. Professor 
Goodman 'thought the Brown case was not really decided on the
testimony given by modern authorities in the famous footnote
2  IIeleven. In fact, there are sociologists who would claim 
desegregation may cause black children greater harm than is
8presumed to result from segregation. For example, A. James 
Gregor cites (a different) Professor Goodman's studies which 
show the psychological harm is at least more evident in in­
tegrated schools, and maybe even greater in magnitude than in
2<segregated schools. J  Even so, Frank Goodman would conclude, 
"while it is possible to argue that the Court considered the 
harmful effects of segregation necessary to its disposition, 
there is not the slightest indication that the Court believed 
them alone sufficient."
Law Professor Goodman seemingly contradicts himself on 
his belief of the true holding in the Brown decision. He 
believes that the major premise of the decision made classes 
based on race unconstitutional when disadvantageous to minor­
ities. The minor premise which follows, he contends, is that 
segregation equals racial classification. Yet, later in 
the same article, he states de jure segregation was outlawed
because, "not that blacks were treated badly, but (that) they
28were treated as blacks."
A lower court case adjudicated several years after Brown 
appears to share Goodman's second interpretation that the 
Court felt the division of students on account of race was the 
true basis for finding de jure school systems to be in violat­
ion of the Equal Protection Clause. The case, Stell v. 
Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, involved a suit 
to get a school board to begin desegregating their schools.
The school board admitted to segregating students, but claim­
ed that they were pondering the proper solution. During the 
hearing, intervenors testified that essentially the Brown con-
9elusion of psychological harm in segregated schools was in­
correct, and to integrate would harm black children. The 
District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The judge 
theorized that the harm claimed in Brown was limited to the 
facts in those particular cases. 0
At the Court of Appeals level, the judges ruled that 
even if the harm was limited to Brown, the Supreme Court ruled 
that separate schools were unequal, and lower courts cannot 
change that. If the Court of Appeals were to rule that blacks 
are less intelligent than whites, with some overlap in thfe 
levels between the races, and then justify racial segregat­
ion on level-of-intelligence groups,then the Court is acting 
unconstitutionally, the judges wrote. So in this case, the 
last word belonged to the judges who saw racial line drawing 
as controlling in Brown.
PART II- HOW THE NAACP WON IN BROWN
The case, Brown versus the Board of Education of Topeka
was not the result of historical accident. Although the name
of Oliver Brown appears as the plaintiff in the case, he did
not act by himself, but with the support and resources of a
full-fledged pi-essure group. The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had been operating
since 1909 to further the interests of blacks. Their strategy
of using litigation to pave the way to reform was summarized
by Professor Vose. He wrotei
During its early years, the NAACP relied upon promin­
ent lawyers like Moorfield Storey, Louis Marshall, and 
Clarence Darrow to represent Negroes in the Courts. 
Limited success coupled with its failure to win gains 
in Congress led the NAACP in the 1930's to make court
10
litigation fundamental to its program. A separate or­
ganisation, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
wasincorporated for this purpose.known: as the Inc. fund)
So Vose claimed the litigation strategy was a direct result 
of failure in the "democratic" (as this thesis' straw man 
'outside observer' would denr-ribe failure in an appeal to 
Congress) area of the United States' political arena.
But Supreme Court jurisdiction only extends to "cases and 
controversies," so the Supreme Court justices are wary of de­
ciding cases where adverse interests are not at stake. Thus 
the Inc. fund needed to find an individual with the grievance 
that would provide them with a test case. Richard Kluger 
detailed the series of events which led Oliver Brown and his 
wife to request NAACP help in suing the Topeka Board of Ed­
ucation in Simple Justice. ^ Kluger quotes a law student in 
summarising Oliver Brown's reason for filing suit, "He was no 
longer willing to accept second class citizenship. Oliver 
Brown wanted to be a whole man."-' That comment sums up the 
NAACP position on the separate but equal doctrine as well as 
their position on what they wanted from the political arena 
that had yet to be achieved for black citizens.
The Inc. fund strategy in litigating cases can be explain­
ed in general terms, and as it applies to the Brown decision. 
Generally, Professor Vose noted the Inc. fund's strategy in 
winning test cases when he wrote, "Each effort has followed 
the development of new theories of legal interpretation and 
required the preparation of specific actions in the courts to 
challenge existing p r e c e d e n t . I n  the Brown case that new 
theory was that segregation creates psychological harm.
11
The theory's development was due to the fact that the Supreme 
Court had not yet ruled on the constitutional merits of the 
separate but equal doctrine as it applied to the field of 
public education.
Just as the NAACP relied on constant followup efforts to 
extend legal theory, so also did they try to snowball their 
victorie^.nto bigger and bigger wins. The Brown decision 
was no lightning bolt out of the blue, as some critics char­
acterize it. Several Supreme Court decisions made prior to 
1 9 5 ^ resulted in allowing black students into white schools.
In Missouri ex rel. Gaines vs. Canada, a black law student 
won the right to attend the University Law School. At the 
time, the state of Missouri had no black law schools and the 
Court dismissed Missouri's contention that they would build 
one when the need arose. Chief Justice Hughes wrote, "a priv­
ilege has been created for white law students which is (now) 
denied to Negroes by reason of their race."^® Another key 
case prior to Brown was Sweatt vs. Painter, which was decided 
in 1 9 5 0 . In that case, a black law student was admitted to a
white law school ’which was deemed inferior by the Supreme Court.^ 
The Court in Sweatt noted for the first time that the equality at
k0
issue transcended a comparison of just the physical facilities. 
Yet, the Court in Brown expressly noted that the issue con- 
trolling in the prior cases was not controlling.
Hence, one sees the efficacy of the Inc. fund in developing 
the "psychological harm argument.
Even with the best efforts of the Inc. fund, litigation 
to gain acceptance of broad legal principles needs the support 
of the Court that sometimes goes beyond merely rendering a
12
favorable judgement. One problem to overcome is that of moot­
ness. Professor Vose points out the labyrinthine path to the 
Supreme Court takes a great deal of time* and the litigant 
may no longer be in the situation for which he sues. In 
Brown, the question of mootness might have been raised if 
Oliver Brown's child had graduated or moved out of the Topeka 
School Board's jurisdiction. As an example of the mootness 
problem Professor Vose specifically points to the Court's
decision to decide the Gaines case even though the'planitiff had
42disappeared just as the case was completed. The second 
problemi allowing an individual to sue over broad principles 
that would apply to an entire class of individuals was okayed 
in Brown. Vose noted this and added Rule 23(a) of the Feder­
al Rules of Civil Procedure has since provided, in a limited 
manner, for this typepf class action.^
Often, Supreme Court ideology would seem to favor one 
group or principle over others. As Sociologist Ovid C. Lewis
Ml
aptly pointed out, the justices order values. Hence, one 
questions whether or not the Supreme Court might aid the pro­
mulgation of their personal higher-ranking values by showing 
favor to groups promoting the same values. From the way the 
Court overlooked the black litigants problems discussed in the 
previous paragraph, it would appear such is the case for civil 
rights litigants.
Political Science Professor Doris Marie Provine tested 
such a contention in her book, Case Selection in the United 
States Supreme Court.  ^ In the book, she analysed Justice-
Burton's personal diaries and calculated during his time on
♦ '
bench (19^7-57), thirty-seven percent of the civil rights/ 
liberties petitioners were granted review, while only seven 
percent of the petitioners challenging a pro-civil rights/ 
liberties lower court decision won review before the Supreme 
Court, (emphasis mine)^ These civil rights/liberties pet­
itioners. "had a more than sixty percent chance^bf winning
reversal of lower court judgements," Professor Provine ad-
L nduced. ' Given this disparity in raw percentages one may be­
lieve desegregation critic John Denton Carter who claimed,
"The members of the Warren Court were not acting as judges
kflbut as advocates."
Summing the analyses of Professors Provine and Vose, one
can se^bhat blacks were some of the beneficiaries of a Supreme
Court whose value scheme tilted toward those with claims of
civil rights violations. This lower barrier to adjudication
played an important role in getting favorable judgements when
individuals filed suit in the manner dxploited by the Inc.
fund. Professor Provine addsi
Unlike labor claimants (who could at least show mon­
etary loss), civil rights-civil liberties claimants 
had to rely primarily on the interpretation of const­
itutional guarantees to justify their arguments for re­
lief, because this (19^7-57) period predated the comp­
rehensive civil rights legislation that now exists. It 
also seems clear that when the Court granted review in 
these cases, it acted not simply because there was a 
constitutional basis for these claims, but because the 
claim rested on personal rights. Constitutional claims 
for equal protection and due process brought by commer­
cial interests over their rights of property were almost 
invariably denied during this period unless they raised 
federalism issues.
That statement summarized the task which faced the Brown 
petitioners as well as outlining the Court's stand on re­
ceiving such cases.
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PART III- POLITICAL REACTION TO BROWN
No matter how one views the. NAACP's efforts in winning 
a favorable decision in Brown, it is clear that the Warren 
Court had ordered a realignment of state imposed dual school 
systems into unitary ones. Thus, blacks had succeeded in le­
gitimizing this specific grievance into part of the supreme 
law of the land. Their success came after apparent failure 
or d .sillusionment in attempting to gain the same .legitimacy 
through elected legislatures. Yet, mere Supreme Court declar­
ation of the law did not necessarily mean those affected would 
immediately or voluntarily comply with such proclamations.
In the area of school desegregation, resistance to the Supreme 
Court was quite pronounced.
Segregationists refer to the May 17, 1954 Brown decision 
as "Black Monday. ® They were ready to fight Brown with 
whatever means they had at their disposal. Yale Professor 
Alexander Bickel delineated their strategy as, "Calling for 
inaction and action consistent with the law, and embodying 
what is loosely called civil disobediance of the law of the
<i
land on the part of both private and official persons."^ In 
Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957 that tactic included a mob of 
whites shouting racial epithets and threatening violence.
Their activity was supported by Governor Orval Fabus who order­
ed National Guardsmen to keep the peace of the area by keep­
ing black students out. Only after President Eisenhower sent 
Marines to Little Rock to insure the safety of the black students 
were the Governor and the mob rebuked.
Another tactic used by segregationists was to close the
14
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public schools and have their children attend all white pri­
vate schools. Nowhere In the Constitution is the right to a 
public education mentioned. In fact, in fierce v. Society of 
Sisters, the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot force 
students to attend public schools when they wish to attend 
private schools i n s t e a d . S o ,  this attempt at resegregation 
would have been successful if segregationists did just this.
But, when the Court took the case dealing with this issue, they 
were also faced with the fact that these so-called "private 
schools" were receiving substantial amounts of state aid.
The case, Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 
found the Court ruling that whites could attend private schools 
if they desired, but the Court is not fooled here—  these are 
private schools in name only.^ If whites were going to leave 
the public schools, they were not going to be able to do so 
with state money.
The greatest aid to the segregationist's effort to delay 
and perhaps overcome the order of Brown and Brown II came from 
the Supreme Court itself. Bickel quotes southern Professor 
H.H. Quine as commenting, "Had the Court ordered immediate de­
segregation, compliance might well have been forthcoming since, 
at the time, there wa« no alternative course of action."^
But the Court had given the school boards the requirement of 
deliberate speed in their judgement.
The Court compounded i t s  own problem in the face of the 
intentional delay which followed Brown II by not reviewing any, 
as Glendon Schubert puts in quotes, "enforcing" decisions 0 1 
the lower courts until Cooper v. Aaron was handed down in 19j5S*^
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Schubert's comment implies, with some truth, thut the lower 
courts, whose task it was to see the Supreme Court's decision 
was enforced, were actually acting in favor of the segregation­
ists. The Stell decision was an excellent example of this 
phenomenon. As was noted earlier, the District Court in Stell 
scuttled Brown and held it did not apply to Savannah-Chatham 
County. Activity such as this meant the NAACP had to go to 
court in each jurisdiction where the delay led to desegregat­
ion progress too slow for their desires.
To measure the success of these delay tactics, one only 
has to turn to the empirical data as it appeared approximate­
ly ten years after Brown. Glendon Schubert notes that not one 
black child was attending the white schools they sued to in­
tegrate in Brown^  As Alexander Bickel totaled the data, only 
two percent of the three million Negro children in an eleven 
state region (in the South) were attending schools with whites 
by December 1 9 6 3 .  ^ The United States Commission on Civil 
Rights compiled data which echoed Bickel's findings. Their 
numbers included the information that such cities as Mobile, 
Ala., Pine Bluff, Ark., Tallahassee, Fla., Atlanta, Ga. and 
Raleigh, N.C., had more than ninety-eight percent of the blacks 
in their respective school systems attending schools which 
were ninety to one-hundred percent black during the 1965-6 
school year. Yet segregationists could still claim that 
"great progress" was being made in desegregating the schools 
by distorting the relative importance of the numbers. At the 
time when only two percent of southern negroes were, in school 
with whites, 11^1 of 3209 biracial districts could claim they
had been desegregated. Of these, Bickel notes, 1^1 of 161
did so voluntarily in 1963* ^
Even though it appears some compliance with Brown did 
exist in the middle 1960's, the blatant noncompliance of some 
school boards was staggering. Towns, and even states continued 
to segregate. One method of obvious noncompliance can be found 
in an examination of where school boards located new schools.
An example of this was given by the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights concerning the city of Houston, Texas. The Commission 
discovered, "Almost every school constructed after 1955 was 
located in racially homogeneous residential areas. Five of 
seven schools built outside the Negro area were nearly all 
white by 1 9 6 5 ."^° Of the fifty-six Negro schools in 19^5»«••» 
forty-nine were newly built in Negro residential areas after 
1955."(emphasis mine)
Noting that the delay was at least successful in slowing 
down what might at first appear inevitable, one wonders what 
segregationists felt they could gain through their political 
activity. They found friendly courts at the lower level 
were overruled at higher levels in response to their activities. 
Professor Bickel sees their strategy of delay and disobedience 
as efforts to hold off segregation until they could win at the 
Supreme Court. He notes this strategy was successfully ap­
plied in response to Adkins v. Children's Hospital (with West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish) and Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
6 2of Education (with Zorach v. Clausen). His theory of seg­
regationist strategy indicates that the opposition to Brown 
also sought to retake that political value via the same method
17
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in which they had lost it* So it was not as if the segregat­
ionists were “playing fair** by only turning to elected offic­
ials; they too wanted the Supreme Court's judgement to fall 
on their side.
Dlack activists were not inactive during this time. Arm­
ed with the Brown decision, they went to numerous de jure 
school districts and filed suit to force desegregation. At 
this point they knew one thing for certaini the Supreme Court 
was on their side now. In Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court 
rejected a motion for additional time in desegregating Little 
Rock, even though the School Board expressed concern for the 
atmosphere of hatred which surrounded their task.^ Blacks 
also found the Court on their side in the fight to cut out the 
delays which plagued their efforts to actually gain the de­
segregation ordered a decade ago in Brown. In Griffin, the
Court announced, “the time for mere 'deliberate speed' has 
6 krun out,"
Even though their efforts were progressing fairly well 
given the amount of opposition they faced, one cannot claim 
the NAACP acted as the one pressure group which represented 
all black interests. Dr. King could rightly, claim that the 
Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), and his own Southern Christ­
ian Leadership Conference worked with the NAACP to fight for 
political gains, but there were other groups who saw those 
techniques and goals promoted by the NAACP to be incorrect
for the black people. Militant groups such as the Black Muslims
66and followers of the late William Lloyd Garrison represent­
ed another view of society from the black perspective. Malcolm
X told Kenneth B. Clark his thoughts on the Birmingham sit-ini
What kind of success did they get in Birmingham? A chance 
to sit at a lunch counter and drink 3ome coffee vdth a 
cracker-- that's success? A chance to-- thousands of 
little children went to jailj they didn't get out, they 
v/ere bonded out by King, they had to pay their way out„of 
jail. That's not any kind of advancement or success. {
Yet, despite I.ialcolm a 's admonition, blacks probably had 
greater success in the conventional political arena after Brown 
than in the judicial forum. First, Congress passed the Civil 
Righto Act of 1957, the first such legislation since-1875. 
Richard Kluger pointed out that the Act admittedly did not go 
very far, but did contain a provision to enable the Justice 
Department to bring suits on behalf of blacks who were denied 
the right to vote.0  ^ Other important legislation included the 
Civil Rights Act of 196*1. Title /I of this Act prohibited the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare from giving fed­
eral money to school districts which discriminated against 
students on the basis of race (among other groups).  ^ Thus, 
Congress placed it3 legislative stamp of approval on a value 
already legitimized by the Supreme Court.
Legislative success can be contrasted with judicial fail­
ure in the 1960's as they attempted to extend Brown to "north­
ern" -type segregation. This type of segregation, called de 
facto segregation, occurred where no law had been written by
the states, but black and white students ended up attending
70separate schools anyway. Northwestern University Law Pro­
fessor John Kaplan followed the early efforts of litigants in 
these cases. The main argument forwarded by the Inc. fund 
seemed to say, "Any action taken by a school board regardless 
of its purpose or other effects would be constitutionally as 
improper as the maintenance of a dual system of schools or the
20
gerrymandering of the zones of a single school district. *
Such was the argument in the Gary case and approximately twenty- 
five other c a s e s . B u t  these early cases appeared to lack 
the invidious discrimination element that characterized Brown—  
The Gary case involved what was termed by Kaplan the "typical" 
pattern of northern school organization! boundaries along major 
traffic routes v/ith no student further than one mile from the
o o
school he or she a t t e n d e d . S o  blacks lost in (Lacy and the 
other cases without the Supreme Court ruling on any of these 
cases.
Hence, the NAACP had to settle for Supreme Court support 
in eliminating de jure segregation. Oddly, the Court's strong­
est call for affected school boards to end the dual system 
came in conflict with a Congress-supported proposal. In Green 
v. School Board of New Kent County, the Court overturned a 
"freedom of choice" desegregation plan that v/as acceptable to 
HEW in the discharge of their duty to enforce Title 71 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as mandated by Congress.^ The Court 
also noted that Virginia had actually passed statutes to 
fight Drown and keep Virginia schools segregated.^ In con­
cluding that even with the freedom of choice plan the school 
board had maintained a dual system, the Court contended school 
boards have been, "clearly charged with the affirmative duty 
to take v.'hatever steps might be necessary to convert to a uni­
tary system in which racial discrimination would be elimin­
ated root and branch."^ Thus, the last major school deseg­
regation decision of the Warren Court contained the harshest 
language yet to those responsible for remedying segregation.
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PART IV--THE BURGER COURT ERA 
The situation described in the previous section detailed 
the situation inherited By the new Chief Justice, Warren £. 
Burger, when he was appointed in 1969* His first desegreg­
ation case, Alexander v Holmes County Board of Education 
went in step with Warren Court decisions by proclaiming that
all motions for additional time were denied and "deliberate
77speed" had ended—  school boards must desegregate now.'' This 
case followed the Warren Court in another respects the Court 
once again restated a position previously enunciated in an 
earlier decision. The end to all deliberate speed had been 
proclaimed in Griffin five years before Alexander, and in 
Green the year before Burger was appointed. Once again the 
lesson is learned that shows a Supreme Court decision is not 
a guar mtee of immediate compliance. Hence, the NAACF still 
had to press on if they were to desegregate the entire South.
Unfortunately for the NAACP, the same call for desegreg­
ation now would have to be repeated as late as 1971* In that 
year, the Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education reiterated their order to desegregate now,
and actually noted they had made the same order in earlier 
78case#. DUt the Swann decision was important for other rea­
sons as well. In the decision, the Supreme Court Sought to 
define the scope of acceptable remedies available to both 
school boards and the relevant district court judges who were 
to insure desegregation took place, "and established unitary 
systems at once."^
The case also involved the extent the district court
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court judges could use their equitable powers to insure de­
segregation. It has been widely misunderstood that District 
Court Judge KcMillian simply ordered massive busing on his 
own initiative to satisfy his own conception of an approp­
riate remedy. But the Judge always maintained that his opin­
ion in Swann was one of constitutional law, not political 
ondealings. He first concluded that the school board plan
submitted to him was unacceptable, and turned to an expert
8 1
in education administration, Dr. Finger. The plan design­
ed by Dr. Finger was virtually identical to the school boards' 
with rsspoct to the desegregation of high sbhool and junior 
high school students. The major difference between the two 
plans dealt with the assignment of elementary school pupils.
In that instance* the Finger plan went beyond gerrymandering 
attendance sones and ordered busing to aid the desegregation 
outcome more fully. Judge NcMillian simply chose the Finger 
plan over the plan submitted by the Sohool Board.
The Burger Court refused to strike down judge NcMillian's 
order. Chief Justice Burger* who wrote the opinion §t the 
Court in Swann, wrote* "The objective today remains to elim­
inate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation."*^ He further defended Judge McMillian's actions 
by adding* "If school authorities fail in their affirmative 
obligations under these holdings* judicial authority may be 
invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown* the 
scope of a district court*s equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad* for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies."®** Still, the Chief Justice added, an ad­
monitions "Remedial judicial authority dooa not put judges 
automatically in the shoes of sohool officials whose powers 
are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local au­
thority defaults."®^
Considering this language comes sixteen years after de 
Brown II. and seven years after deliberate speed was held to 
be no longer controlling* one must conclude (as the NAACP aid) 
that the school boards in districts where the effects of do 
jure segregation had still not been eliminated had defaulted 
in their duty to end the state-imposed dual systems. As News­
week noted in its 3 May 1971 issue* the Inc. fund planned to
file suit in at least forty-nine cities to get new integration
86programs using Swann as their weapon. What appears differ­
ent in the Swann ruling from all others whieh came before it 
is the approval for judges to take matters into their own hands 
Barlier oases seemed only to feature judges rejecting plans* 
then ordering sohool boards to try again until they got it 
right. This represents a greater political commitment from 
the Court to let the judicial system enforce its own decisions.
One might think advocates of a limited use of judical 
power would claim* "foul.* The Burger Court*they might con­
tend* is going too far to support a line of cases which has 
already been given superior treatment by the Court. Not so* 
claimed the Chief Justioe. He defended this seemingly over­
board reaotion when he wrote* "a sohool desegregation case 
does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the 
framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a con­
stitutional right."®?
Burger went on to limit the scope in which Swenn was ap­
plied. Pirst he noted, "We do not reach in this ease the 
question whether a showing that school segregation is a con-
s OQ
sequence of other types of state Action. Thus, he Units 
the holding in Swann to tradtional Brown-type constitutional 
violations.
The Chief Justice followed that admission with an anal­
ysis of four areas of dispute which arise when district court 
judges seek to determine a "proper" level of integration.
The first problem area he discussed was whether or not the 
goal of a proper desegregation remedy is racial balance. It 
appeared that Judge MoMillian framed his remedy to meet a 
racial balance goal, but Burger dismissed that contention®? And 
added a warning, "If we were to read the holding of the Dis­
trict Court to require, as a matter of substantive constit­
utional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mix­
ing* that approach would be disapproved and we would be obli­
ged to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate 
schools does not mean that every sohool in every oeamunity 
must always reflect the racial composition of the sohool sys­
tem as a whole.
Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong note that the above 
section Was widely misinterpreted by Federal Distriot Court 
judges. The authors of The Brothers^contend that these judges 
felt the Swann decision had ordered then to achieve racial 
balance. In about twenty desegregation cases following the 
decision, the district court judges ordered massive busing. 
Understandably, The Chief Justice was reported to be quite 
upset by the misinterpretation of his opinion. He felt Swenn
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merely called for deeegr •«■**•*■♦* not full scale integration.*2 
If Woodward <amd Armstrong's ooatontlon (as wall as Burger's) 
is correct, then blaoks gained a tremendous boost in satis­
fying a political objective through the implementation of a 
mistake in legal analysis by those charged with interpreting 
the law.
Whatever the true holding on racial balance might be, the 
Chief Justice followed its disoussion in Bwann by considering 
whether or not an acceptable desegregation plan could include 
a small number of one race sohools in the district. Burger 
believed they could .have a mall number of these sohoilS in an 
acceptable plan, but the burden of proof would be on the school 
board to show that sohool assignments were made in a nondie- 
orlminatory manner. The importance of this holding may be 
better seen when studying oases disoussed later in this thesis.
Most in Innili °°urt addressed the issue of remedy 
by gerrymandering attandanoe tanas. There , Burger noted 
that "racially neutral" assignment plans nay not be enough 
tc overcome past segregation?^ How he offers this statement 
and squares it with his burden of proof in allowing for a 
number of one race sohools if the sohool board can show its 
assignment polioy is nondiscrininatory is anybody's guess.
But he oontinues, "The remedy for such segregation (i.e. de 
jure) may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even 
bisarre in some situations and nay impose burdens on somei 
but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in 
the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made 
to eliminate the dual systems."^ With that comment, the Court
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gave its approval to awkwardly drawn attendance aonea as a 
viable remedy to a desegregation order.
Finally, the Swann decision notes that busing is a per­
fectly acceptable remedy as applied to the Charlotte-Meck- 
lenburg school system. The Court pointed out, "Che trips for 
elementary school pupils average about seven miles and the 
District Court found they would take 'not over 35 minutes at 
the most.'"9* The Court did add a caveat, noting the use of 
busing should be balanced against the harm it might cause the 
very young and, "district courts must weigh the soundness of 
any transportation plan in the light of subdivisions (1) (2) 
and (3) a b o v e . I n  other words busing should not be the 
dominant remedial form—  just one consideration to be mate 
from among many.
Kith phrases like, “weigh the soundness," and "not un­
acceptable," one understands why judges had a difficult time 
applying Swann to the situations they faced. The decision 
did not explain what a unitary system looked like, or how to 
tell when a dual system had been ended. Yet, the 
Law Review offered a potential explanation as to the cause of 
the mistake that led lower court judges to order massive bus­
ing in the wake of Swann. The Law Review noted, "Swann pro­
vides lower courts with a model of a unitary systemi the Char- 
lotte-Mecklenburg schools.”^' Hence, these judges may just 
have copied Judge McMillian's order, which did include ex­
tensive busing.
In terms of political analysis, the Swann deoision was 
a success for the desegregation movement. Richard Kluger
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noted, by tho 1972-3 sohool year, thoro was a greater 
eentage of blacks attending white-majority sohools in ’outh 
than in the N o r t h . D i s t r i c t  court judges now seemed 'Old 
school boards to the order to desegregate now. But how can 
this success be explained? First, school districts had been 
desegregating throughout the 1960's and the Swann decision 
may have merely broken the logjam of antagonistic cases which 
piled up. ^ Second, segregationists may just have gotten 
tired of the waiting game, A conservative Chief Justice had 
written an opinion no more favorable than the despised Bari 
warren. In Bickel's analysis of the segregationist's strategy. 
West Coast Hotel came fourteen years after Adkins, and Sansfe 
only four years after Illinois ex rel. McCullum. So sixteen 
years after Brown II with no favorable end in sight may have 
forced diehard Brown opponents into giting up. This conclu- 
sionmhfcght be seen in thereaction ef desegregation opponents 
to the iwenn decision. Segregationists' dislike for the de­
cision shifted from hatred of the Court for ordering them to
race mix to hatred at the Court for ordering them to race mix
100while not ordering the same for the North.
One point this thesis has made with regularity has been 
the repetitiveness with which the Court has had to restate 
doctrine in an attempt to gain compliance with their decisions.
It has been offered here that the effacacy of pressure groups' 
use of the courts to win political gains must fall under quest­
ion if no one obeys judicial orders. With that in mind, one 
should compare *" commentary on acceptable remedies—
whioh set off this successful desegregation drive in the South—
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to the language in Brown II which alao pondarod remedial tech­
niques! "To that and (allowing for aora tiaa to lat aohool 
boards coaa up with tha propar desegregation plan), courts 
may eonaidar problems relating to administration, arising from 
tha physical condition of tha school plant, tha achool trans­
portation system, personnel, revision of school districts, and
attendance areas... and revision of local laws and regulations
101which may be necessary in solving tha foregoing problems.”
H&wsweek noted that before Swann, several states actually out-
102lawed busing as a method of desegregating their schools.
Honed, SWann oartially restates what was already considered 
sixteen years earlier.
After Swann, blacks still faced de facto segregation in 
the North and West areas of the United States. Earlier efforts 
to get ths ilapemms eeurt te give the NAACP this victory went 
unanswered by the Court. In 1973, the Inc. fund won a case 
which appeared to give them the legal doctrine they could uae 
to snowball into bigger de facto segregation victories. The 
case, Keyes v, School District Humber One of Denver, repre­
sented the NAACP's first successful salvo into the area of 
de facto s e g r e g a t i o n . I n  that case, the Denver County 
School Board had not maintained traditional de jure segregation 
in any part of the district. The Inc, fund claimed that the 
Park Hill area ef Denver was, "by the uae of various techni­
ques as the manipulation of student attendance senes, school 
cite selection, and a neighborhood school policy," a type of area
which maintained racial separation suoh that the Supreme Court
104should order systemwide desegregation.
The Supreme Court accepted tho NAACP!s proof that tho 
School board had engaged In an unconotltttional policy of seg- 
rogation with rospoct to tho Park Hill area.*0* Tho Courtto 
inquiry then turned to tho quootion as to whether a desegreg­
ation order could extend to areas whore the parties was not 
proven. The reet of Denver, had not been aanipulated in the 
way the Park Hill area had been* the parties agreed. The 
Sohool Board wanted the Court to view those two situations as 
distinct. The Court refused to do so outrighti they instead 
concluded, "where plaintiffs prove that the sohool authorit­
ies have carried out a systeaatic program of segregation af­
fecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, 
and facilities within the school system, it is only common 
sense to conclude that there exists a predicate forva finding 
if* the existence of a dual sohool system."*°°
This language has resulted in a great equivocation. The 
term de jure referred only to state-ordered segregation, as 
Justice Brennan points out in Keyes. Though he calls the 
Denver School Board*■ notions de jure, he also make references 
to the existence of a "dual system" (as in the quote above).
If the mere existence of a "dual system" had to be proven,
(though even Brennan claims that's not enough1 in Keyes)..to win 
a desegregation order, then all the school systems in the North 
with large numbers of one race sohools could be ordered to de­
segregate no natter how innooently their situation developed.
That is not the holding in Kavaa. but now a "dual system" 
means a de jure system for legal purposes. '
Whatever the language, the Court in Keyes reeegaless far 
t he f  fcrst tlgs^ihat there is a type of unconstitutional sag-
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regition different i?oa the Brown-type that ia atato commanded, 
Thia now principla attempts to aake aohool boards roaponaibla 
for thoir own segregative behavior. In Keyes. tha Danrar 
School Board would have to conrinca tha dlatrict court that 
thla behavior waa not thair conacioua choice or that thev/aeg« 
negative Affect would have occurred anyway or tha diatrict 
court could order a systemwide remedy.10®
Legal analyata who triad to predict how tha Court would turn 
to da facto caaaa in tha wake of Swann, did ao with conaider- 
abla accuracy. Law Profaaaor Owen M. Piaa wrote in hia art­
icle. "The Charlotte-Meokienburg Caaa—  Ita Significance for 
NorthernSohoAl^BeMgyafation." that khw Oourtwill ahift ita 
focua to a study of tha oattarna of aagragation—  hence aora 
conducive to remedying northern-type segregation.10® Eviden­
tly, Piaa found enough dictaa imathe Swann deciaion to be 
able to aee the ahift which waa alluded to in Kayaa. Juetice 
Brennan hiaaelf oitea Swann when announcing the opinion in 
Kayaa.110
Still, cogent legal analyaia had aoae acholara wary aa 
to haw far the Supreae Court would extend the "patterns of 
aagragation” focua when predicting Kayaa. Profaaaor Ooodaan 
wrote in 1972. "Thia auch aeeaa clean the exiatence of rac­
ially imbalanced atudent bodiea under a bona fide eyetea of 
non-racial toning cannot, without aora. be characterised aa a 
aa a product of pact unconatitutional diacriaination.”111
Ifcii insight, what did the Keyes ruling aay 
with respect to future da facto school segregation law suits?
The holding appears to say that the diatrict courts will have
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to u k *  several findings of fact. First • destgregationists 
will hsro to prove, to tho oourt's satisfaction, that at loaot 
a part of a sbhool district had boon ds jure segregated, based 
on tho sbhool board's history of school sits selection, atten- 
anco sonos, transfer options, transportation systems and all 
tho other indices which southern petitioners used to prove 
southern sohool boards wore not attenpting to desegregate as 
ordered in Brown II (that tho southern school boards wore main­
taining tho dual school systems). If tho court accepts this 
proof, then tho school board must either prove that this por­
tion of their school district is distinct and separate from 
tho rest of the distriot er that tho effects of this part of 
tho distriot have no effect on tho district as a whole. If 
theydistrict court rejeots tho school boarded arguments, then 
tho court will assume tho petitioner has presented a prime 
facie case of systemwide do jure school segregation.
When tho court concludes a prise facie case exists, then 
tho burden of proof has shifted to tho school board. The 
school board then has two defenses to moot tho burden to show 
thid is not intentional segregation. One defense is to prove 
that whatever governmental interest they forward as to tho >• 
rationale behind their educational objectives, tho imple­
mentation of tho'-program to forward this interest must not 
have boon created with tho intent of creating or maintaining 
segregation in tho system as a whole. If tho district court 
finds tho school board fails hero too, then if tho sohool 
board can prove that tho segregative result would have occurred 
anyway, no matter what thOir intent, then tho school board 
has mot tho burden. So eitywide desegregation can bo order-
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•d if one, the district court fools that the part of the school 
diotriot which is do jure segregated effects the entire sys­
tem, or second* the school heard fails to rebut the prisa 
facie case of systeawide intentional segregation that the 
petitioner's proof of partial do jure segregation sets in 
notion.
Justice Douglas had to settle for Brennan's recognition 
that certain school board activities can constitute state 
action. Douglas did not like the fact that Brennan attempt­
ed to aaintain the do jure/de facto distinction in deciding 
these eases. He believed since any school board's act­
ivities can be held up to Fourteenth Aaeniaent scrutiny* a 
showing of segregative polioy is de jure illegal segregation* 
and nothing else.1*^
Either way one accepts the rationale of the Court* the 
Keyes case holds important political raaifications in two 
respects. First* the Court once again voiced its policy that 
litigants seeking reaedy froa the Court aust prove deliber­
ate state activity has led to the situation causing the griev­
ance. Thus* whatever role that hara played in the Court's 
decision in Brown, it aust be linked to state polieyaaking 
before the Court will intervene. So one can conclude Pro­
fessor Goodman's theory as to the holding in Brown that was 
similar to the holding in Stoll (sse pp..8-9) has been borne 
out in Keyes.
The second important part of the Keyes opinion can be 
applied to discrimination claias aore generally. The Supreme 
Court implies in Keyes that claims of racial discrimination
art not proron b. a iur< ■ ing of impact alonoi potitionoro 
must alao bo able to ahow discriminatory (hero segregative) 
intant on tho part of tha lawaakara to gain radraaa in Equal 
Protaction Clauaa challenges. Tha Court rulad just thia way 
in two later-1970's eaaaa. Tha firat, Washington v. Pavia, 
involved a taat givan to all applioanta to tha Washington D.C. 
police^department. Tha taat waa failad by a diaproportionata 
nuabar of blacks. who claiaad thia impact was diaoriainatory. 
After Eaves-like inquiries into tha intant of police officials 
as wall as tha rationale for giving tha test* tha Court rulad 
that disproportionate impact alome was not enogh to uphold 
their constitutional claim.***
Tha second case, Arlington Heights v. Mettopolltlan 
Housing Development Corporation, involved a Chicago suburb's 
refusal to resone for low-income housing. In this case tha 
Court applied the sama^urdens and defenses tha school board 
faced in So while tha Court extended tha foous of
their desegregation enquiry in Keyes, they forshadowed the 
manner in which they would limit certain racial discriminate 
ion claims in the future.
Although the Supreme Court had instructed the district 
courts to make findings of fact in da facto discrimination 
cases in the wake of Kevejtoie Court did not provide these 
judges with any empirical guidelines to make these findings. 
Por example! judges were not instructed as to how substantial 
a do jure segregated area had to be to affect the school sys­
tem as a whole to have a systemwide effect. The Columbus 
Board of Education v. Psnick case did nothing to clear up
3k
the quandry.11®
In that cas*t« tha Columbus School Board olaiaod at tho 
tiao of tho auit,thoy voro running tho ontiro aohool ayatoa 
In a racially non-discriminatory manner. In tho Keyes caao 
tho petitioners showed that tho Denver County School Boat’d 
had boon operating an enclave of do jure segregation at least 
up to 1969* The party charging illegal segregation in Col­
umbus only proved that the School Board had been running a 
purposefully segregated system at the time of Brown. They 
also proved that until recent times, The Columbus Board of 
Sducation operated in a manner which perpetuated the segreg­
ated system.11'
The District Court and the Court of Appeals both found
against the Columbus School Board. The order to initiate
118a systemwide remedy was upheld by the Supreme Court. The 
Court ruled on the question of whether a finding of past un­
constitutional segregation is enough to allow district court 
judges to order systemwide remedies, when the past practice 
was no longer followed today. The Court refused to disagree 
with the lower courts findings that ikhe impact of this past 
do jure segregation lasted up to the time of the suit. Then 
the Court extended its inquiry into whether a school board 
had to dismantle the dual system it was operating uncon­
stitutionally at least until 195^.
The Court appears to agree with the lower courts' con­
tention that since the Columbus School board was operating 
an illegally segregated school system at the time of Brown, 
they were thus under the affirmative duty to desegregate
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the dual system, citing Brown'II and Green. The Supreae
Court aleo approved of the Investigation the District Court
undertook in examining whether the School Board had ar
ually performed its affirmative duty and took steps to elim-
120inate the dual school system. The Court also noted that 
the District Court studied School Board actions and practices 
since 1954, and found they had engaged in activities which 
actually promoted, rather than reduced racial separation in 
the schools. Thus the Court commented, "Against this 
background, we cannot fault the conclusion of the District 
Court and Court of Appeals that at the time of trial there 
was systematic segregation in the Columbus schools that was
the result of recent and remote intentionally segregative
122actions of the Columbus Board." The Court also held that 
the lower dburti correctly applied the Keyes. Wasinxton. and 
Arlington Heighta testa that required proof of intent by de­
monstrating an awareness of their duty to use these tests and 
then making the inference that intent was evident.12^
Needless to say, this opinion appears extraordinarily 
muddled. Justice Rehnquist felt the result of this case would 
be to open up every school board sued to "judicial receiver­
ship" unless they undertook voluntary segregation instead of 
fighting the suit.121* The Court, he felt, created an "irre­
buttable presumption" that the courts need only find a dual 
system in 1954 and segregated system at the time of the suit—  
coupled with evidence that the school board did nothing to 
allieviate the racial imbalance in the interim—  to legally 
order systemwide desegregation. Since school systems operat-
119
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ing in this aanncr did know they were operating illegal­
ly in 1954, or were charged with the duty to atop thia
behavior and actively aerate# every system waa thua char­
acterised by discriminatory purpose in the years following
1954,125
Rehnquist correctly notes that Keyu3 never took into 
account what the Denver School Board waa doing in 195^* Thua 
he aakea the claia that uaing 195^ aa a benchmark date aa to 
when school boards aust have begun to end the dual systems 
aakea no sense. But Rehnquist is strangled by his own logic. 
The Court in Keyes took into account what was done in the Park 
Hill area from i960 to 1969* Thua the benchmark date could 
involve an investigation into discriminatory purpose before 
or after 195*t. It appears the Court is saying in thesa cases 
that what was illegal in the South after 195^» was illegal 
in the North after 195^» if the Keyes test of unconstitution­
al discriminatory intent is failed by northern school boards.
Yet, Rehnquist was correct when he complained that the
order of a remedy based mi not redressing behavior not known
to be illegal until 1973 serves little retributive benefit.
But the Court has pondered and approved of ordering remedies
retroactively imposed after determining that a constitution­
al right had beei violated as a result of the adoption of new
127theeries of constitutional interpretation in other areas.
In ^ e r t w  beard ef Education v. BrinkmanOaytonll), dee 
cided on the same day as Columbus, the Court Was presented 
with a similar situation but a different District Court find­
ing than Colambus. In this case, the District Court examin­
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ed th* evidence and concluded a systeawide desegregation or­
der was not needed. The Court of Appeals« reviewing the tran­
script of the lower court proceeding# claiaed that the finding 
by the District Court was dearly erroneous and overruled the 
lower court. The Supreae Court# after a review of the argu- 
aonts forwarded by the Court of Appeals# affiraed their de­
cision.12®
Here# the Court used the ease test they affiraed in Col- 
unbus and noted that given a finding of intentionally segreg­
ated schools in 1954 by the Court of Appeals# the School 
Board then had the duty to eradicate this segregation. Yet# 
by noting# "every school which was 90* or aore black in 1951-52 
or 1963-64 SL 1971-72 and which is still in use today reaains 
90* or aore black,"12^the Court also agrees with the Court of 
Appeals that the School Board had failed in their affiraative 
duty to create a unitary sohool aystea. Hence# the Supreme 
Court was willing to accept the Court of Appeals order of a 
systemwide remedy.
Again# as in Keyes, the Court throws around the phrase 
"dual system" with little care. Here# it appears that a dual 
system need only be a school aystea with a saall (or large) 
nuaber of one-race sohools that gained that feature before 
1954. Thus it appears the "irrebutable presumption" feature 
of the Coluabus test# as Justice Rehnquist interpreted it# 
had come true. Before Dayton,II. the Court was perfectly 
willing to let the district oourts make findings of fact—  
even though they gave the judges no real standards as to 
"Substantial effect" or what constitutes a "dual system."
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Now in Dayton XI. the Court agrees with tha Court of Appaala 
that tha District Court's finding of faot was claarly erron­
eous. Justioa Stewart) who oonourrad in Columbus and dissan- 
tad in Dayton II. did so because ha fait tha appeals courts 
should dafar to tho findings of fact as determined by tha 
district oourtsi tha laral of tho Judiciary charged with that 
duty.1^0
Proa a legal standpoint) decisions in tho so«eAllad da 
facto school eases are at bast confusing. District court 
judges probably have no idea what type of school systen would 
truly fit tha da facto appalation. Tha individual justices 
on tha Supraaa Court have their differences' as to what the 
Coluabus version of tha Kayes test actually requires. Soaa 
of those justices scratching their heads do sea one thing* 
tha increased use of tha court system to make the decisions 
on running schools discticts batter left to school boards. 
How, they might ask) did tha court's role expand so far out 
of proportion? Brown 11 expressly ordered tha school boards 
to right tha harm they visited upon blacks. To conjecture) 
one of two reasons night be a possible answer to the above i 
question. Either district court judges saw that it took six­
teen years before Brown was truly redressed and they wanted 
to avoid the same struggle in the Morith. er %hev saw Bwann 
gave them a simple tool) the judicial ordert that worked ef­
fectively. Either wayt no one can argue direct judicial in­
tervention suoh as the type brooded over by Justice Powell in 
his dissent in Columbus has played <a key role in desegregat­
ing northern school districts.1^1
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From a political standpoint! black political activists 
won a groat deal from those casoa. Not only did they win de­
segregation orders in an area previously foreclosed to thaw in 
earlier cases• but they also received an admission from the 
highett court in the land that there can be state action vio­
lative of the Squal Protection Clause that is not expressly 
announced in state legislatures. Couched in political terms, 
the Court finally recognised that n particular state's sov- 
erignty is vested in many institutions that are located miles 
away from the statehouse. Just as Justice Black refused to 
be fooled by the segregationists' seeming switch to private 
schools in Griffin, so too did Justice Douglas refuse to be­
lieve school boards were not agents of state action* as the 
meaning is conveyed by the Equal Protedtion Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. ^ 2 Yet* Justice Douglas' view is not 
quite constitutional law. It is however implicit in a const­
itutional test so arcane that no school board may ever be able 
to pass it.
In analysing the Supreme Court's handling of the deseg­
regation cases during the Burger Court era* one must be amazed 
at the path school desegregation traveled in this time. Warren 
E. Burger* characterized by the authors of The Brothoron. as 
a political conservative* strict constructionist by his own 
belief* wrote the decision which* for all intents and purposes* 
ended the delay which plagued efforts of redress of tradition­
al de jure segregation since Brown II Almost as amazing 
was the fact that Swann differed very little in content from 
what was written in Brown II.
ko
After Swann, the Burger Court actually went one step fur­
ther than the Warren Court was ever willing to in the area of 
de facto school segregation. The Warren Court denied every 
petition for certiorari that raised that question) while the 
Burger Court legitimised the grievance of blacks that northern 
and western school systeas should be desegregated too. One 
should note, the most unctuous of the de faoto desegregation 
decisions, Coluwbus and Dayton II. were written well after 
the Nixon appointees were established on the benoh. The opin­
ions also came after such ardent desegregationists as Hugo 
Black and Willian 0. Douglas werelongof f the bench. So 
the Columbus and Dayton II results may be an indication that 
school desegregation was an issue which is above partisan 
judicial politics. It was for a while, as almost all decisions 
up to Swann were unanimous opinions. Even Justice Rehnquist 
would admit that blacks constitute a protected class whose 
grievances usually are subject to the highest scrutiny, even 
if he did dissent in Coluwbus and PiyfrlLlI*
Yet there is one decision handed down during the Burger 
Court era that desegregationists must worry about. The Pasa­
dena Board of Education r» Shaanxior case involved an accept­
able desegregation plan for 1970 whieh was segregative by 197** • 
The Court ruled that once the city fufilled its requirement 
in 1970, they did not have to draw up new plans absent a find­
ing of deliberate segregation. This means the black desegreg­
ation movement may have no legnl redress if the play of econ­
omic and social factors resegregat* school districts where 
the Inc. fund has won desegregation. Then, de facto segreg-
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desegregation will be an issue for the legislative political 
arenai where Professor Kaplan thought it belonged in the first 
place.*^5 And the South's new segregation will be the same 
type as the North's - subject to the saae non-involvement by 
the Court.
___ part y -  B*p..rgfi___
So far this thesis has examined how blaek litigants won 
sohool desegregation through favorable Supreme Court decisions. 
Their viotories came at the hands of an "activist" Court, 
critics would eontend. Glendon Sohubert would agree. He 
wrote. "One type of activism is when the Court becomes the pro- 
tagonsit in policymaking while other political decisionmakers 
do nothing. Brown is one example. It was in conflict with 
the President. Congress, and legislatures of every state.
The question then to be addressed is. "Is it bad that nine un­
elected men aiould be given enough power to reorder a segment 
of society?"
Prom the point of view of the litigants the answer is 
obviously no. Professor Arthur Miller noted about the Brown 
decision. "By design or happenstance or possibly because the 
justices had insight into a system of absolute values, some 
secants of society unable Is benefit IgSB Stk1 Pluralistic 
politioal process found a champion in a handful of lawyers." ^ 7  
(eifchisls nine) Certainly, seuthem blacks could not oount 
on their legislators, one hundred and one ef when signed the 
Southern Manifesto decrying the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brown. S o  minority interests at least can enter a political 
forum where their grievance carries equal weight as opposing 
interests—  the oourts.
Sometimes* thair claim carries greater weight in the 
Supreme Court. As Sociologist Lewis noted earlier* justices 
order values. Svem justices Douglas* Brennan* and Frankfurter 
acknowledged that the Court keeps up with social change—  to 
keep the Constitution in step with the times. Thus* claims 
made by a group asserting a call for social ohange nay have 
the upper hand when dealing with a Court whose value scheme 
is similar to the litigants. Professor Miller viewed the 
justices value seheme in Brown as* "the movement toward do-
1(laconey—  toward stating affirmative principles of morality."* 
But one should not be too easily swayed by claims that 
the Supreme Court behaves like Plato's* "Philosopher-Kings*" 
distanced and above the internal politicking of the ether 
branches of government. Warren Burger was asked by one of 
his colleagues on the Court what principle of constitutional 
law he was resting his opinion that a public park in Georgia 
should be integrated. His reply was* "We are the Supreme
l4lCourt and we can do what we want*" The book* The Brothoron 
is full of anecdotes detailing Chief Justice Burger's polit­
ical machinations. This political maneuvering even extended 
to the school desegregation cases. There* the Chief Justice 
wanted Keyes put over to the next term in hopes that heard 
alongside a ease in whioh the justices were certain to find 
against desegreagation litigants* he could change their minds
4k9in Keyes too Hence* one gets the impression from reading 
The Brotheron that even if justices are ordering values* they 
do so in a definite political manner.
On the other hand* as Professor Miller noted* "most
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commentators* on and off tho bench, who attack activism for 
being undemocratic do so oithor without vouchsafing a defin­
ition or assume* aa if it wort self-evident* that Congress 
and legislatures generally ara democratic," Bran if ona 
assumes that the aeleetion of congressmen ia the reault of 
alaotiona oharaotariaad by cogent roter decisions* the law- 
aaking prooeaa itaelf doea not aoea influenced by auch a de­
termination.
One example of thia undemocratic lawmaking prooeaa ia 
found in the committee ayatem of the Houae and Senate. Billa 
introduced are almoat always aent to the relevant committee 
for further atudy. In the committee ayatem. hearinge are held, 
and teatimony ia given aa to the value of the bill. Theo­
retically. votea are taken on each bill and thoee which paaa 
the vote of the oeamittee are aent to the floor for a vote
1 l ± kby all the members of that particular legislative body.
In reality, bills which do not meet the personal standard of 
the committee chairman never see the light, of day. with few 
e x c e p t i o n s . T h i s ,  in effect, means almost all of the 
elected legislators having the desires to voice the concerns 
of their oonstituients on particular issues (especially via 
the vote), are foreclosed from doing so by the desires of one 
legislator.
Another undemocratic feature of the American lawmaking 
process is linked to the> committee hearings referred to above. 
In these hearings, the expert testimony is given by members 
of pressure groups and representatives of the relevant admin­
istrative agencies. Since no individual member of Congress
can poaaibly keep informed on all tha subjects which oonfront 
him, dafaranoa to thasa apaclallata la great. Professor Ira 
Caraan lndlcataa how this phenomenon, known aa " government by 
whirlpools," works with raspaet to daaands by tha Uni tad 
Statas Aray Corps of Engineers. Ha eoneludas by noting, 
"Running throughout tha abora account, of eoursa, is extsm- 
alltad dalagation of powsr, for thara ara no statutory guide- 
linas to constrain aithar tha corps as it aakas govarraiant 
policy or tha ayriad prlvata groups soaking to influanea tha 
corps."*^(emphasis his) Thus, in soaa cases, turning to 
specialists loads to a dalagation of power by Congress to 
unelected political actors.
Until now, this analysis has bean based on tha acceptance 
of tha argument that individual voters make decisions based 
on whatever particular interests they hold in esteem. Recant 
studies on tha subject indicate that this assumption may be 
spurious. Two researchers, Thomas E, Mann and Raymond E. 
Wolfinger came to conclude that although tha public has a 
batter knowledge of tha congressional candidates than earlier 
theorists balivad, "the content of (their) evaluations is 
both thin and highly personalised, with little apparent ideo-
4kfllogical or issue content” Another study found that voters 
in Presidential elections tend to side with candidates whose 
"symbolic" orientation (e.g. liberal or conservative) is sim­
ilar to their own rather than candidates on their side on part­
icular issues (e.g. busing). ^ Hence, voter behavior at best
cannot be seen as one of response to particular issues—  and 
thus the mandate on such issues is blurred.
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A different view of determining the acceptability of jud­
icial activism is to look at whether this practice is accept- 
ed by the various political actors. Por example, the Brown 
decision eventually garnered the political support of both 
the President and Congress. Presidents as idSSlogically di­
verse as Eisenhower and Kennedy both sent troops in to ensure 
the safe integration of blacks into schools in Arkansas and 
Mississippi. Congress bestowed its mantle of legitimacy of 
allowing blacks to make political gains through the courts 
with the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1964 
when they allowed the Justice Depatrment to file suit on their 
behalf. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically referred 
to aiding in desegregation s u i t s . O f  course, these actions 
were not instituted immediately after the Brown decision, but 
they came nonetheless.
Other groups whose actions convey a sense of legitimacy 
upon the actions of the Court are the pressure groups them- 
sevles. The role of these groups in the legislative process 
has been noted earlier by Professor Carmen. Bickel's theory 
of southern school board delay included the hope of segreg­
ationists that they could draw out the desegregation process 
until they could gain a favorable decision from the Supreme 
Court. But this legitimacy may be forced upon pressure groups 
by the American system of government. Professor David B. 
Truman points out in his book. The Governmental Process.
"when an act has been declared unconstitutional, however, 
almost the only'recourse, unless the (C)ourt reverses itself, 
is the long, slow, and seldom traveled road of constitution-
*1 amendment."1^1 He alto notes tht acctptanot of tho courts
In society bo downgraded, "if the judiciary or a segment of
it operates in such a fashion sharply contrary to the expect-
1<2ations of an appreciable portion of the comunity." The 
quote itself implies decisions in favor of the Minority will 
be disliked by the Majority if aggravating enough to their 
values. Thus, the Majority is willing to tolerate the exist­
ence of the court system only if that system does not contra­
vene strongly held values of the majority.
But that last comment is almost circular in configurat­
ion. The very reason forwarded by this thesis for groups go­
to court to win political gains is because they fail in their 
battle in their battle with majoritarlan interests-- who only 
support the court if their interests qra Uphdld by the court. 
The only problem here to the straw man 'outside observer* is 
that the the Supreme Court justices keep thoir jobs even with­
out majoritarlan support.
This realisation returns on^to the question of whether 
this represents "democracy.* The thesis has already shown that 
the elected legislators behave in an undemocratic manner. It 
has also been shown that the conerstone of reprentatlve gov­
ernment, the voter, does not appear to make his candidate 
selection based on any particular criterion which would pro­
mote any specific interests he or she might have. Thus, even 
if the Supreme Court did not exist, American representative 
democracy would still not be very democratic.
Then what do the Supreme Court and the American politi­
cal system as a whole have to offer that political scientists
can laud? First, one must realise that the American politi­
cal system is unique. Eugene Y. Rostow, in his article, "The 
Supreme Court and the People's Will, " states that. "The Constitution 
did not give Congress the full powers • of the British Parl- 
iment."1^  The court system in the United States has been 
granted political power that other court systems do not have.
The benefit of this was noted by Professor Truman when he wrote,
"A characteristic feature of the governmental system in the 
United states is that it contains a multiplicity of points 
of access"1-^ This means that all parties seeking political 
redress of grievances have more than one avenue open to them.
Hence the tradeoff is more access versus less than total rep­
resentative government in the American political system.
Having a Supreme Court render judgements in civil rights 
cases has a beneficial effect which goes beyond ordering val­
ues in the manners desired by the winning party. First, Pro­
fessor Truman notes that the Court is an institution of gover­
nment which has gained widespread political acceptance because 
it appears to be, "independent of the overt activities of or­
ganised interest g r o u p s . W h i l e  that acceptance was strain­
ed in the desegregation issue because of the seeming favorit­
ism visited upon desegregationists, a factor in the Court's 
political legitimacy is the notion that it is separtae from 
the problems which plague the pluralistic political lawmaking 
process. Hence, the Court restrains the undemocratic elements 
of pluralism by offering political claimants another forum 
free of taint.
A second beneficial effect of Supreme Court activism
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comes when ths Court do*s”goodN. As was noted earlier, Pro­
fessor Miller liked the Court's deoision in Brown on moral 
grounds* Rostow saw the Court's role in promoting eiril 
rights and civil liberties as having, "been an educational 
force, among others, in helping to mold a state of opinion 
far more sensitive to civil liberties than that which prevail­
ed in the United States thirty or fifty years ago."1^  Of 
course, what is "good" is for each individual te decide. And 
that ultimate decision may or may not come at the time judge­
ment concerning a salient issue is handed down. As was noted 
earlier in the wake of Swann, the opposition's dislike for 
these judicial decisions ordering southern desegregation may 
remain constant while the reason for the disapproval may shift. 
Any way one views the decisions of the Supreme Court, even if 
he thinks it promotes "bad", will not neglect the Court as 
a source to do "good" for them.
___PARE'VI- CONCLUSIONS___
Through this thesis, one can see that it would be very 
much in a pressure group's interest to use the court system 
to try to win political gains. The percentage of black stu­
dents in schools with under fifty percent minority enrollment 
rose from 37.1 to 43.2 from just 1974 to 1976 a l o n e . T h e  
victory for desegregation supporters has been a long one, how­
ever. The repetitiveness by which the Supreme Court enoun- 
ciated constitutional and legal doctrine makes one question 
the power of the Court to see its orders obeyed. But one 
must conclude that the blacks and the NAACP have won a def­
inite victory, even though litigation continues on this issue.
%
With the decision in Pasedema. a threat to all tha deseg- 
rogation victorias exists. That case opened the door to legal 
resegregation if whites relocate themselves after a valid de­
segregation order is handed down in a particular school system. 
Another cause for alarm for the desegregation movement is the 
split between the Inc. fund and the NAACP proper. The Chicago 
Tribune reported that the NAACP has actually sued the Inc.
fund over the use of its initials. The newspaper notes that149the two organisations have moved apart over the years.
Thus the NAACP has lost its legal arm and the direction of 
civil rights activities may be pulled in two different direct­
ions.
How can other groups repeat the NAACP's success to date? 
The answer to that question lies in the discussion of the test 
the Court used to apply to equal protection cases, the ration­
al basis/strict scrutiny two tier test. Recall, the Court 
looked more strongly at claims of those who either forwarded 
an assertion of a violation of a fundamental right or that 
could prove they were being discriminated against as part of 
a class as defined by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. Professor Carmen noted those who claim a 
violation of two fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of speech 
and religious freedom) trigger an even higher level of scrutiny 
by the Court.
Today, the two tier test has been replaced by several 
alternative tests, including a three tier test. In Craig v. 
Boren, the Court subjected "middle tier" scrutiny to a claim 
of gender-based class discrimination. lSlTh. middle tier soru-
i
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tiny was just as it soundsi tha classification drawn was not 
deemed invidious enough to trigger ths highsst scrutiny, hut 
it was dubious enough to call for swathing more froa the state 
than aere rational relationship to a governmental obj active 
in order to uphold the law challenged. Justice Brennan want­
ed to confer the highest scrutiny to claias of equal protect­
ion violations brought by woaen. The Bretheren reports that 
he lost the'battle by one vote. 2
Whatever test is used, aost groups know which level they 
fall under. Hispanics know that they fit the protected olass 
status shared by blacke. ^ On the other hand, white ethnics, 
such as Geraan-Americans know their equal protection violation 
assertions will only get the weakest level of scrutiny.1^* 
Along with fitting into the right category, litigants 
will have to persuade the justices to follow their value sys- 
tea. That'task night be quite difficult when faoing a Court 
with a different value scheae froa the particular group whieh 
wants ohange. Glendon Sohubert thinks that, "A aajor swing 
in public opinion (such as that which resulted in the elect­
ions of Jackson and Pranklin Roosevelt...) produces Presidents 
who are relatively eztreae (in position on the liberalism- 
cons ervat ism continuum)i and such non try to appoint justices 
who represent the values of the new majority. If the new 
majority can hang together for at least a decade, it is virt­
ually certain that the value orientation of a majority of the 
justices will be t r a n s f o r m e d . A b s e n t  this ocourrenoe, the 
likelihood is that groups on the wrong side o f , the Court's value
system will have difficulty Hatching the NAACP's success in 
using the Court to win sohool desegregation.
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